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Abstract 
 
Children encounter anthropomorphized objects on a daily basis: in advertisements, media, 
and books. Past research suggests that features like eyes or displaying intentional, goal-
directed behaviors, increases how humanly non-human agents are perceived. When adults 
and children anthropomorphize, they become more socially connected and empathetic 
towards those entities. In advertising, this anthropomorphic effect is used to get people to 
connect with the product. This thesis explores what effect anthropomorphizing might have on 
preschoolers’ moral reasoning about those entities, and suggest that it increases the 
likelihood that children will explain non-human agents’ harmful actions in a moral sense. 
Specifically, the present study examines the anthropomorphic effect of a proper name on 
moral reasoning in preschoolers. Four- and 5-year-olds who heard a story about a caterpillar 
named “Pete” who was killing plants in their garden were more likely than children who 
heard about a “caterpillar” to think it was appropriate to squish it. We argue that because 
children believed Pete could experience the world (e.g., emotions) and had agency (e.g., 
intentional action) more so than an unnamed caterpillar, then Pete could also be held morally 
accountable for its harmful actions. A proper name has an interesting effect on preschoolers’ 
moral reasoning about non-human agents.    
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What’s in a Name?: Preschoolers Treat a Bug as a Moral Agent when it has a Proper Name 
 As the sole survivor of a plane crash, Tom Hanks, in the movie, Castaway, lived 
alone for four years on a small, unpopulated island. He became so desperate for human 
interaction that he anthropomorphized a volleyball: he drew a face on it, named it Wilson 
(after the brand), and developed such an emotional connection that he mourned its loss when 
it washed away. In this example, naming the ball seemed to be a key feature that helped 
Hanks develop a humanlike attachment to it. A name seemed to transform the volleyball into 
something capable of humanlike capacities such as feeling emotions or having ideas. Past 
research has shown that giving humanlike characteristics, such as eyes or goals, to non-
human agents leads to increased emotional connection (Serpell, 2002), increased empathy 
and understanding towards the agent (Harrison & Hall, 2010), and increased moral 
attributions and responsibilities placed on the agent (Waytz, Heafner & Epley, 2014; Epley, 
Waytz & Cacioppo, 2007).  But there is little research specifically examining the 
anthropomorphic effect that a proper name has on people’s attributions of humanlike 
qualities to non-human agents.  
This thesis is part of a larger project with adults and preschoolers that explores the 
effect of naming a non-human agent, like an insect, on attributions of human, and especially 
moral capacities. Specifically, this project examines whether naming a caterpillar that is 
killing garden plants will lead preschoolers to treat the caterpillar in a more humanlike way 
than one that is not named: expecting it to be able to think about and be morally culpable for 
its behavior and to experience emotions like pain or fear.   
Anthropomorphism is the tendency to attribute humanlike characteristics, like having 
emotions or intentional behavior, to non-human agents (Epley, Waytz & Cacioppo, 2007). 
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Previous research on the effects of anthropomorphism in adults has found that 
anthropomorphizing can have important consequences for people’s judgments and behaviors 
related to the non-human agent. For example, advertising posters about environmental 
conservation that were anthropomorphized with features like eyes, mouths, and emotional 
distress led adults to express more support for the environment, more willingness to purchase 
environmentally-friendly products, and to feel more connection with nature than posters that 
were not anthropomorphized (Tam, Lee, & Chao, 2013). Adults rate technology, such as 
automated vehicles, as more reliable when the vehicle is anthropomorphized with a name, 
gender, and voice than when it is not (Waytz, Heafner, & Epley, 2014). Similarly, pet owners 
who anthropomorphize their pets experience more emotional connectedness, empathy 
(Harrison & Hall, 2010) and responsibility for that pet’s well-being (Serpell, 2002) than pet 
owners who anthropomorphize their pets less often. Anecdotally, food-source animals are 
usually not given names, presumably for the opposite effect: less emotional connectedness 
and sense of responsibility, making it easier to kill and eat them. The point is that making 
non-human agents more humanlike changes how adults view the agent, their expectations 
about it, and how they treat it.   
Anthropomorphizing changes the way adults explain events, particularly those that 
they would not otherwise understand because adults attribute humanlike mental abilities to 
the anthropomorphized agent. Attributing human mental abilities, like having beliefs or 
feelings, to non-humans helps adults to apply their previous knowledge and experiences to 
explain ambiguous actions of non-humans (Epley et al., 2007). For instance, Waytz, Epley, 
Monteleone, Gao, and Cacioppo (2010) found that when a computer inexplicably crashed on 
a regular basis, people explained those events by giving the computer human capabilities, 
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such as “having a mind of its own”. The more unpredictable the “behavior” of the computer, 
the more humanlike mental abilities the adults applied to it. The more predictable the 
behavior, adults rated the computer as lacking a “mind of its own” as well as not being able 
to act on its beliefs. A similar effect was found when adults interacted with unpredictable 
robots (Waytz et al., 2010). Adults asked a robot any 10 yes-or-no questions of their 
choosing. The robot’s responses were rigged to answer “yes more”, “no more”, or “yes” and 
“no” equally. When robots were unpredictable in how they responded, participants explained 
the behavior by attributing human capacities to it (i.e., free will, consciousness, intentions, 
beliefs). In contrast, when the robot’s responses were predictable, participants claimed that 
the robot was stable and easier to control. 
Adults are more likely to treat non-human agents as moral agents who are worthy of 
care and concern when they are anthropomorphized. For example, Ahn, Kim, and Aggarwal 
(2014) showed adults a lightbulb that had humanlike features (nose, mouth, eyes) and held a 
sign with the message, “I’m burning hot, turn me off when you leave!”. Compared to a 
lightbulb that lacked humanlike features, adults were more likely to turn the lightbulb off and 
felt more anticipatory guilt for noncompliance. The authors argue that adults may be 
attributing more moral considerations to a humanlike lightbulb and as a result feel more 
obligated to turn it off to protect it from harm.  
Complementing this argument, Waytz, et al., (2014) found that adults applied more 
blame to an anthropomorphized autonomous vehicle when it made a mistake than a non-
anthropomorphized one. Adults participated in a driving simulator in which the car was 
either the car was either agentic (having control of its speed and steering), 
anthropomorphized (having same controls as agentic but also possessing a name, gender, and 
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voice), or a normally operating car (Waytz et al., 2014). While in this driving simulator, the 
vehicle was involved in an accident and adults were asked to rate how much they blamed the 
car, as well as how much they trusted and liked the vehicle. Results showed that adults rated 
the agentic and anthropomorphized vehicles as more trustworthy and likable than the normal 
vehicle, but adults also placed more blame on the agentic and anthropomorphized vehicle for 
the accident. When an autonomous vehicle could control its actions, adults treated it as a 
moral agent that was responsible for those actions.  
Like adults, children’s expectations about non-human agents change when agents are 
made more humanlike. In one study, infants as young as six months were shown wooden 
shapes with googly eyes that were moving up and down a ramp. One shape made several 
unsuccessful attempts to climb the ramp, and was either pushed down or helped up by two 
other anthropomorphized shapes. Later, when infants were given an opportunity to interact 
with the helpful or harmful shape, they avoided the harmful one (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 
2010). Interestingly, infants did not have the same reaction when the googly eyes were 
removed and the shapes became inanimate objects as they did to the humanlike shapes that 
seemingly had goals and emotional life (Hamlin et. al, 2010; see also Hamlin, 2015). In other 
words, anthropomorphizing the shapes led infants to hold them morally accountable for their 
actions the way they do with humans– at least to the extent that they “punished” the harmful 
shape using social exclusion. They did not imbue human abilities like intentional behavior 
when the shapes were dehumanized and thus did not consider morals as an explanation for 
the way the shapes moved on the ramp (Scarf, Imuta, Colombo, & Hayne, 2012). 
This link between moral accountability and humanness is even more developed in 
preschoolers. The more humanlike the non-human agent is, the more control children believe 
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it has over its own actions Preschoolers have been shown to attribute goals and intentionality 
when encountering a humanlike robot (Kamewari, Kato, Kanda, Ishiguro, & Hiraki, 2005). 
Somewhat older children become more selective with the human attributes they project onto 
non-human entities even when they are anthropomorphized. For example, 4 and 5-year-old 
children expected a named robot to have goal directed behaviors and biologically living 
qualities (e.g. being “alive”), but did not attribute those capacities to other types of machines, 
like an anthropomorphized TV, (Somanader, Saylor, & Levin, 2011). 
Older children are mixed as to the extent to which personified objects, even extremely 
humanlike ones like humanoid robots, should be considered as moral agents. For example, in 
one study 9-year-olds had a conversation and played a game with a humanoid robot, Robovie 
(Kahn Jr, Kanda, Ishiguro, Freier, Severson, Gill, & Shen, 2012). The experimenter then put 
Robovie in a closet before it had a chance to finish its turn and did so without regard for 
Robovie’s objections (i.e., “I want to keep playing the game. Please don’t put me in the 
closet.”). Interviews with the children revealed that most believed that Robovie had mental 
states (e.g., was intelligent and had feelings) and that Robovie deserved fair treatment and 
protection from psychological harm. But, they did not view Robovie as having other moral 
rights like civil liberties (e.g., it could be bought and sold).  
One reason why there are developmental differences in the effect of 
anthropomorphizing on moral accountability may have to do with children’s changing 
perspective taking abilities. Children are beginning to understand that humans have unique 
mental states, desires and beliefs during the preschool years; this is known as theory of mind 
(Wellman & Liu, 2004). Understanding that humans have differing mental states allows 
children to better understand what varying agents should be capable of and the expected 
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perspective of that agent (Lane, Wellman, & Evans, 2010). When individuals 
anthropomorphize, they are better at perspective taking (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; 
Myers, Saunders, & Garrett, 2003;). For example, in one study 4-year-olds were better able 
to reason about the needs of an animal in distress when they drew it in an anthropomorphized 
form (Myers et al, 2003). In other words, when animals and objects take on humanlike 
qualities, children are more likely to reason about its mental states in relation to its behaviors. 
This is particularly true when the non-human agent is in distress (Batson et al., 1997; Myers 
et al., 2003). To summarize, when children anthropomorphize, they are more likely to 
perspective take, consider reasons for behaviors, and recognize needs of a non-human agent.  
Perspective taking is also related to feelings of empathy. Empathy is the ability to 
comprehend the affective or cognitive status of another being (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). 
Airenti (2015) argues that to truly feel empathetic one must have a sense of connection to the 
target and make an assumption that it has a mental life. Because anthropomorphism involves 
attributing mental states to non-human entities, Airenti suggests that empathy for a non-
human entity is facilitated when it is anthropomorphized. Relatedly, Eisenberg (1987) argues 
that prosocial behavior (e.g., protecting something or someone from harm) arises in part from 
feelings of empathy towards a target. Taken together, understanding what a mental life is 
facilitates feelings of empathy and prosocial behavior. Therefore, as children become better 
at mentalizing, they may also become better at mentalizing about non-human, 
anthropomorphized agents.  
  Anthropomorphizing can occur in a variety of ways for both adults and children: 
adding humanlike features like faces (Ahn et. al, 2014; Hamlin et al., 2010), goal-directed 
behavior (e.g., Hamlin et al., 2010; Waytz et. al, 2010), and socially-contingent interactions 
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(Kahn Jr et.al, 2012), to name a few. The feature this project was particularly interested in 
exploring was providing a proper name to non-human agents. A proper name serves to 
individualize its referent from other, similar referents (e.g., Tom vs. boy) and is a uniquely 
human characteristic (compared to, for instance, eyes) (Hall, Veltkamp, & Turkel, 2004). The 
handful of studies that included a name as a means of anthropomorphizing in adults did not 
isolate the effect of a name. There are no studies we have found with children and using 
names to anthropomorphize, but there is some work that explores what toddlers will induce 
about category members when they are given proper names.    
Gelman and Taylor (1984) showed 2-year-olds stuffed animals and block-like toys 
and labeled one of them with either a proper name (e.g., “Zav”) or a common noun (e.g., “a 
zav”). Later the experimenter asked the toddlers to manipulate the toys (e.g., “put Zav/a Zav 
in the basket.”). When animals (but not blocks) were referred to with a proper name, toddlers 
assumed there was only one of them. They would select the one specific stuffed animal to 
manipulate whereas they would select both block-like toys equally as often. This study 
suggests that proper names lead young children to induce humanlike qualities about non-
human objects, and that it was easier for toddlers to anthropomorphize animals than artifacts 
(see also Hall, Lee, & Bélanger, 2001, who found that dolls were easier to anthropomorphize 
with proper nouns than stuffed animals). 
Older children become selective about what things are “allowed” to be given proper 
names. For example, they accept that people, dogs and cats can have names, but resist names 
for flowers, candy, and leaves (Hall et. al, 2004). They may be selective about what can be 
named because they assume that named objects also have human qualities, and they know 
that not everything in the world should have those capacities. In terms of the thesis, children 
WHAT’S IN A NAME?  11 
 
 
 
 
may not think that caterpillars or other bugs are entities that should have names, and so they 
may not treat a named or unnamed bug any differently. 
 In summary, anthropomorphizing influences our expectations and treatment of non-
human entities. Several studies have shown that when non-humans are made more humanlike 
we view them as moral agents, capable of observing, evaluating, and judging others, being 
culpable for their own actions and deserving of punishment for moral transgressions. We also 
become more emotionally connected and empathetic to personified agents, wishing to protect 
them from harm, behavior prosocially towards them, and placing a priority on their welfare.  
This thesis investigates the extent to which anthropomorphizing via naming activates 
these outcomes in preschoolers. We thought this age was a particularly interesting age to 
study because children are just beginning to develop clear boundaries about what a moral 
action is, compared to other behaviors like social conventions. For example, children from 
ages 3- to 7-years participated in a study in which they observed 5 different immoral actions 
and had to make a judgement of whether the action was immoral and deserving of 
punishment (Smetana, 1981). The results showed that children can identify an immoral act, 
even if there is no explicit rule about the behavior, and believe violations deserve punishment 
(Smetana, 1981). Children in this age group show that they understand humans as being 
moral agents and are to be held accountable for their actions. In our study, children might 
think harming the garden is a moral violation for personified caterpillars. Preschoolers also 
have a newly forming understanding of others’ mental lives, and so their way of thinking 
about who can be held as a moral agent may be different from adults’ conceptions.   
Preschoolers learn that a caterpillar, who is either named Pete or not named, is eating 
plants in a garden that the children have worked hard to create. Children are told that the 
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caterpillar’s actions will ultimately kill the garden plants and they must decide whether to 
squish it or save it. Children are also later asked about their expectations of the caterpillar’s 
ability to experience the world in a humanlike manner (e.g., to feel pain or fear) and to have 
agency (e.g., act intentionally).    
 One hypothesis is that children may consider a named caterpillar as a moral agent: 
able to think about the consequences of its behavior, make choices that are benevolent or 
malevolent, and be culpable for those choices. In this case, a caterpillar ought to “know 
better” than to cause harm, an important moral transgression in the preschool years, and one 
that is consider serious and punishable by children this age (e.g., Smetana, 2006). Children 
may be more likely to want to punish (by squishing) a named than an unnamed caterpillar.  
 Alternatively, preschoolers may feel more emotionally connected to a named 
caterpillar, experience more empathy towards it, and be more likely to want to protect the 
caterpillar from harm even though it is harming the garden. In other words, children may be 
more willing to squish an unnamed, less humanlike caterpillar because they are less likely to 
attribute moral rights to it and are more focused on saving the garden plants. 
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Methods 
Participants 
Thirty-two children between the ages of four and five-years-old (M =4;10; range = 
4;0 to 5;11; 16 girls) participated. Children in this study were primarily white, from middle-
class backgrounds, and were recruited from the local community. Two children (one 4-year-
old boy and one 5-year-old girl) were excluded due to a video camera technology 
malfunction and error in procedure, respectively.  
Design 
This study was a between subjects design with naming status as the between-subjects 
factor of interest. Fifteen participants were in the named condition (Mage=4;11; range = 4;0 to 
5;11 ; 7 girls). Fifteen participants were in the unnamed condition (Mage=4;9; range = 4;2 to 
5;3 ; 9 girls).  
Materials 
Each session was audio and video recorded using a video camera. The emotion scale 
was printed on a piece paper with a paper-clip attached as the slider and showed five faces in 
a horizontal line that gradually progressed from a frowning face on the left to a smiling face 
on the right (Appendix A). Two identical containers were used in a sticker task; one had a 
picture of a house, and the second a picture of a caterpillar. The storybook was shown using a 
PowerPoint presentation on a laptop.  
Procedure 
Approval documents from the IRB and consent forms used can be found in Appendix 
B and Appendix C, respectively. Participants were tested individually in the laboratory or in 
a quiet room within a preschool for a single 10-minute session during which children heard a 
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story about a caterpillar and answered several questions. The researcher sat across from the 
children at a small table and began the study by reading a story to the children about either 
Pete the caterpillar or an unnamed caterpillar and asked them to imagine that they were the 
main character.  
Children in the named condition learned about a caterpillar named Pete. The 
researcher showed children a picture of a house and garden and said, “I want you to imagine 
that this is your house, and in your backyard you have a garden. You worked hard planting 
all of those plants in your garden!” This part of the story served to place children as the main 
character in the story and to help them feel a sense of ownership over the garden. The 
researcher than explained that a caterpillar was crawling on the plants and eating the leaves. 
She asked children to imagine that they named and handled the caterpillar, “You look like a 
Pete. After naming Pete, you hold him in your hand.”. Children are then told they have to 
decide what to do with Pete and the consequences of either choice: they can either do 
nothing about Pete and the garden plants will die because Pete will eat all the leaves. Or, they 
can squish Pete so that he can’t eat any more leaves, and save the plant. The procedure for 
children in the unnamed condition was exactly the same, except that the caterpillar was 
simply referred to as “the caterpillar” rather than as Pete. 
After the story, the researcher asks children a series of questions. First, she asks 
children to decide how likely they are to squish Pete/the caterpillar by using a sliding scale 
(Appendix A).  She explains that they can move a paper clip slider to a number between 0, 
meaning that they are really sure they would not squish, to 4, meaning that they are really 
sure they would squish. Next, the researcher asked the children if they thought it was okay or 
not okay to squish Pete/the caterpillar and to explain their answer.  
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Regardless of their initial response, children were asked to imagine how they would 
feel if they really did squish Pete/the caterpillar and to indicate how good or bad they would 
feel using a face scale. The face scale had five faces with expressions ranging from feeling 
really bad to feeling really good. The faces scale was adapted from the previously validated 
Wong Baker Faces Pain Rating Scale (Tomlinson, von Baeyer, Stinson, & Sung, 2010).  
The next phase of the study involved a sticker task and a questionnaire. The sticker 
task was meant to measure whether the children were willing to give up a valued good to 
help save Pete/the caterpillar. First, the researcher showed children a container with 10 
stickers and asked them to pick out their five favorites. Children then saw two more identical 
containers, one with a picture of a house and the other with a picture of the caterpillar from 
the story. The researcher explained that, “the box with the house on it is where you can put 
stickers to take home with you. The box with the caterpillar on it is where you can put 
stickers to give to Pete/the caterpillar from our story. Each sticker that gets put in this box 
helps save the caterpillar from getting squished. You can put as many stickers as you want in 
the box to take home, and as many stickers as you want in the box to give to Pete/the 
caterpillar.” The researcher then turned away, so that she did not influence the children’s 
response.  
Once the children completed the task, the researcher then proceeded with a 
questionnaire that measured how much agency and experience the children attributed to the 
caterpillar from the story (Appendix A). Agency is considered the ability to independently 
act on one’s own free will. To measure agency, children were asked “Can Pete/the caterpillar 
think like you do? Can Pete/the caterpillar can do things on purpose like you do? Can 
Pete/the caterpillar remember things like you do?” We were also interested in the type of 
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experiences children thought the caterpillar was capable of having. The researcher asked 
children “Can Pete/the caterpillar feel pain like you do? Can Pete/the caterpillar can feel 
hungry like you do? Can Pete/the caterpillar have feelings, like being happy or scared, like 
you do?” to measure how much experience the children granted the caterpillar. Summative 
scores were created for both variables, ranging from 0 (least experience/agency) to 3. The 
child was reminded that there were no right or wrong answers, that the researcher just wanted 
to know what the child thought, and to answer each question with a yes or a no.  
At the end of the study the researchers asked the children, “to tell me how much you 
like caterpillars using these faces”. The same faces scale used previously was used here, but 
the faces meaning ranged from really disliking caterpillars to really liking caterpillars. The 
children were then thanked for their participation, for being a great helper, and asked if they 
had questions. If the study was conducted in the lab, they were given the stickers they 
allocated for home and the choice between two small gifts (e.g. a beach ball, a yo-yo, t-shirt). 
These questions were asked in the same order for all children regardless of condition. 
Which side the sticker boxes in the sticker task were placed on was counterbalanced across 
conditions.  
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Results 
Preliminary results revealed no differences in age, gender, or order so all analyses 
were collapsed across those variables.  
A one-way MANOVA was conducted with naming status (named; unnamed) as the 
independent variable and willingness to squish (0-4 scale), how child would feel to squish (0-
4 scale), expectations about caterpillar’s experience (0-3 summative score), expectations 
about caterpillar’s agency (0-3 summative score), and sticker sacrifice (0-5) as dependent 
measures. As Figure 1 shows, there were two factors where the conditions differed. There 
was a significant difference between the named (M = 2.47, SD =.83) and unnamed (M=1.67, 
SD= 1.18) conditions for experience, F (7, 22) = 4.62 , p = .04, partial 2  = .142. What this 
means, is that naming the caterpillar led children to expect it to have experiences such as 
feeling pain, hunger, and emotions like happiness and sadness. There was also a significant 
difference between the named (M = 1.6, SD =1.12) and unnamed (M = .87, SD =.99) 
condition for agency, F (7, 22) = 3.6, p = .068, partial 2 =.114.  As with experience, children 
in the named condition expected the caterpillar to be more humanlike in its mental life than 
children in the unnamed condition: being able to think, have intentions, and memories.  
Although children in the named condition perceived Pete’s experience and agency to 
be more humanlike than children in the unnamed condition, children in both conditions were 
equally (un)willing to squish the caterpillar (Mnamed = 2.26 , SDnamed =1.58 vs. Munnamed 
=2.26, SDunnamed =1.83). Children also did not differ by condition on how willing they were 
to sacrifice a valued resource – their favorite stickers – in order to save the caterpillar (Mnamed 
= 3.6, SDnamed =1.05 vs. Munnamed =3.6, SDunnamed =1.12). Children in both conditions were 
willing to sacrifice, on average, 1.4 stickers to the cause of saving the caterpillar. Children in 
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both conditions felt about the same (about average on a scale of 0 to 4, with 4 = feels very 
good) when asked to imagine that they did squish the caterpillar (Mnamed = 2.67, SDnamed = 
1.63 vs. Munnamed =1.8, SDunnamed =1.82).  
The number of children who responded, “it’s ok” to squish the caterpillar was 
marginally different by condition. There were more children in the named condition who 
responded “yes” (10 children) than in the unnamed condition (4 children), Fisher’s exact test, 
p = .07. In other words, although children earlier were equally (un)willing to squish the 
caterpillar themselves, when asked if it was OK to squish it, children in the named condition 
said yes.  
How children felt about squishing the caterpillar (4 = really good) was moderately 
correlated with whether they said it was OK or not to squish it. In the named condition, r(28) 
= .657, p = .004, and in the unnamed condition, r(28) = .669, p = .003, children who said it 
was OK to squish the caterpillar felt better if they imagined squishing it than did children 
who said it was not OK but squished it anyways. Similarly, how children felt about squishing 
the caterpillar was strongly correlated with how likely they said they were to squish it 
initially (4= very likely). In the named condition, r(28) = .812, p = <.0001, and in the 
unnamed condition, r(28) = .789, p = <.0001, children who were more likely to squish the 
caterpillar felt better about squishing it than those who were less likely to squish it but asked 
to imagine doing so anyways.  
  Taken together, these results suggest that a proper name influences whether children 
think that a non-human agent can experience the world and think like a human can. A name 
also affects preschoolers’ decision about whether it is OK or not to squish a harmful insect. 
In short, preschoolers think that personified harmful caterpillars ought to be squished – even 
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if they don’t want to be the one to squish it. The qualitative data, described next, offers some 
insight into why children might think so.   
Children were asked to explain why they thought it was OK or not OK to squish the 
caterpillar. Three children (2 in the named condition and 1 in the unnamed condition) 
responded with “I don’t know”. The remaining explanations fit into one of four categories: 
focus on the plants (e.g., “It’s OK because the plant will be dead if you don’t squish it”; “It’s 
not OK because the plant’s won’t really die”), focus on Pete/caterpillar (e.g., OK: 
“caterpillars eat plants and that’s not good” vs. not OK: “the caterpillar could die”), 
respecting nature (e.g., OK: no examples vs. not OK: “they are a part of nature”), or concern 
about themselves (e.g., OK: no examples vs. not OK: “it might sting me”). Most children 
gave one reason, but 1 child in the unnamed condition and 4 children in the named condition 
provided two reasons for their decision.   
Saying it was OK to squish the caterpillar was more common in the named (10 
children) than in the unnamed (4 children) condition. In the unnamed condition, all 
explanations centered around protecting the plants (e.g., “the plant will be dead if you 
don’t”). Explanations were more varied in the named condition. Four explanations were 
focused on punishing Pete for hurting the plants (e.g., “then it would be dead”). Three 
explanations focused on protecting the plant (e.g., “the plants might die”). Three explanations 
focused on themselves (e.g., “I like to”). Importantly, only children in the named condition 
seemed concerned about holding the caterpillar morally responsible for harm. It did not occur 
to children in the unnamed condition that the caterpillar ought to be punished for the harm it 
caused the plants.  
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Saying it was not OK to squish the caterpillar was more common in the unnamed 
condition (11 children) than in the named condition (6 children). In the unnamed condition, 5 
explanations focused on concern for the caterpillar’s well-being (e.g., “the animal should stay 
alive”). One explanation expressed doubt about the plant’s need for protection (e.g., “the 
plant won’t die”). Two explanations were about following general rules about respecting 
nature (e.g., “they are a part of nature”). Four explanations were about their own well-being 
(e.g., “it would sting me”). In the named condition, 4 explanations expressed concern for 
Pete (e.g., “it is bad for caterpillars”). One child was skeptical about the plant actually being 
harmed (“it might not eat the plant”). One child cited concern for nature more generally (“I 
love nature”), and 2 had no explanation.    
Regardless of whether children said it was OK or not to squish the caterpillar, 
children in the named condition at least considered the caterpillar in their reasoning 
somewhat more often than children in the unnamed condition (8 explanations vs 5, 
respectively). Children in both conditions mostly reasoned about the plants if they said it was 
OK to squish the caterpillar and mostly reasoned about the caterpillar if they said it was not 
OK to squish it.   
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Discussion 
 What’s in a name? For preschoolers in this study, a name changed the way they 
judged the harmful actions of a non-human. They were more likely to say it was OK to kill a 
harmful, named bug than one that was not named. Compared to an unnamed bug, children 
were more likely to believe a named bug could experience pain, hunger, and feelings like 
people do. And they were more likely to believe a named bug could think, behave 
intentionally, and remember things the way people do. Although a name activated moral 
thinking about the caterpillar’s harmful behavior, it was not enough of a motivation to 
convince children to kill the caterpillar themselves or to sacrifice a valuable resource to save 
the caterpillar. 
 One reason why children thought it was more OK to kill Pete and less OK to kill an 
unnamed caterpillar, is because Pete was considered a moral agent. Being a moral agent 
means that an entity can discern right from wrong and can be held accountable for its actions 
(Gray & Wegner, 2009). Preschool-aged children expect moral transgressions - behaviors 
that violate the rights or welfare of others – to be punished appropriately (e.g., Kondrad, 
2013, Smetana, 1981). Harming the plants was a moral transgression in part because Pete 
ought to have known better, being capable of thinking about right from wrong. In contrast, an 
unnamed caterpillar was just a bug trying to survive– incapable of thought and therefore 
incapable of understanding right from wrong. Indeed, as one child said, “caterpillars like to 
eat plants”. That’s just what they do, there is no bad intention behind it. Only a moral agent 
can intentionally mean to do harm.  
That children think it is acceptable to squish a named bug but not an unnamed one is 
an interesting finding for two reasons. First, it is the opposite of how adults respond to a 
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similar paradigm (Monroe & Kondrad, in prep). Adults are more likely to sacrifice their 
plants and protect Pete. They feel more emotionally connected to Pete and more anticipatory 
guilt about killing it despite the damage it is wreaking on their garden; adults feel little 
remorse about killing an unnamed and harmful caterpillar. These reactions are typical of 
adults when reasoning about anthropomorphized objects (e.g., Ahn et. al 2014; Serpell, 
2002). This study shows that children reason very differently. Adults want to save Pete, 
preschoolers want him squished. One question for future research is to explore what 
cognitive differences might lead preschoolers’ judgments to focus on moral culpability and 
adults on protection from harm when non-humans are anthropomorphized. It is possible that 
adults may be more sensitive than children to harmful punishments if they have to dole out 
the punishment themselves. When adults are more physically distant from harm they are 
more willing for it to occur (Fei, Jiaxi, Lei, Shoupeng, Danmin, & Jiaxi, 2017). This may not 
be the case for children. For example, adults are willing to kill one person to save five in 
contexts where they are physically separated from the harm (i.e., they flip a switch that kills 
someone vs. they push someone off a bridge with their own two hands).   
 A second reason that it is interesting that more children thought it was OK to squish 
Pete but not an unnamed caterpillar is because previous research has suggested that children 
this age tend to focus on the outcome rather than the intention of a moral agent (Kahn Jr et. 
al, 2012). For example, children believe someone who intentionally hits another person is 
equally punishable as someone who does it on accident (Xiaoying, Yifang, & Xiaolu, 2017). 
But in this thesis work, the ability to have intentional actions – part of what we measured as 
moral agency – seems to influence how children are reasoning about appropriate 
consequences. A named caterpillar is judged as having more agency or more intention, and 
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children were more likely to say it was OK to punish its harmful behavior by squishing it. 
Future work could explore why in this case, children do seem to consider intention in their 
moral reasoning. One possible explanation is that when children encounter an entity that they 
believe has full control over their actions, the children view them similarly to how they 
would another human (e.g., Kahn et. al, 2012). In other words, children might place the 
burden of responsibility on Pete but not on a caterpillar because if Pete thinks like a human, 
then he must have known that it was not okay to eat my plants. Doing it anyways then was no 
accident; he was in full control of his actions and therefore the victim deserves retribution 
and Pete deserves punishment.  
  Although children in the named condition thought it was OK to squish Pete, they did 
not really want to do it themselves. When they were asked how likely they would be to 
squish Pete, they were noncommittal. Similarly, children in the unnamed condition were not 
willing to give up many of their valued stickers to help save the caterpillar even though they 
thought it should not be squished. One question for future work would be to make clearer the 
amount of harm the caterpillar was causing and how many stickers it would take to save him 
(vs. squish him). If children had a more extreme vision that all the plants would die, not just 
one or two, or if they better understood the amount of effort it took to grow the garden in the 
first place, or if they knew exactly what they had to sacrifice to save the caterpillar or ensure 
it would be squished, we would have a clearer understanding of the effect of naming.  
 Future research could also explore whether secondary emotions like guilt would 
change the type of consequence children thought Pete should have for harming the garden 
plants. In this study, they thought it would be OK to squish him for his behavior, but what if 
Pete felt guilty for what he had done? Vaish (2018) suggests that guilt is a key emotion for 
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facilitating children’s willing to cooperate and get along with others. Secondary emotions are 
essential components for increasing empathy (Waytz & Epley, 2010). Seeing the caterpillar 
feel guilty might lead children to feel more willing to treat it in a way that would lead to a 
resolution rather than “the final solution”. Likewise, if children had a more extensive 
interaction with Pete – they actually got to hold a real caterpillar, play with it, see it do tricks 
and so forth – they may become more socially connected to it and be more willing to, like 
adults, overlook the harmful behavior.  
 Finally, individual differences in how likely children are to anthropomorphize could 
explain some of the variance in our data. Waytz and Epley (2010) developed the adult 
Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire (IDAQ), which could be adapted 
for use in young children.  Participants are first shown two videos of animals interacting, and 
then they rated the emotions, both primary (fear, pain, surprise, anger) and secondary 
(admiration, shame, remorse, guilt) of the animals from the video. Adults who had higher 
IDAQ scores (rated agents as more anthropomorphic) attributed more secondary emotions to 
the animals from the video. Perhaps children with higher IDAQ scores would respond more 
like adults – a name would make them feel socially and emotionally connected with the 
caterpillar and therefore increase an empathic response.   
Proper names elicit anthropomorphizing in preschool aged children, just as they do 
with adults. However, preschoolers differ in their interpretation of a named caterpillar’s 
harmful actions compared to adults. They view a named caterpillar as morally culpable for its 
actions, deserving to be squished. This is an interesting first step towards understanding how 
preschoolers attribute moral rights to nonhuman agents.  
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Figure 1. Children rated Pete as having more agency (M = 1.6, SD =1.12) and experience (M 
= .87, SD =.99) (could feel emotions, pain, and hunger) in comparison to the unnamed 
caterpillar. 
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Appendix A 
Experimenter Script 
NAMED CONDITION  
 
We are going to read a story about a caterpillar (on computer), and afterwards you’ll answer 
some questions about the story and what you thought about it. 
 
Slide 1: Imagine that this is your house, and in your backyard you have a garden. Here it is!   
 
Slide 2: You worked hard planting all those plants in your garden.  
 
Slide 3: As you look at your plants, you notice a caterpillar crawling on one plant and eating 
the leaves.  
 
Slide 4: As you look at the caterpillar crawling and eating, you pick him up and think, “You 
look like a ‘Pete’.”  
 
Slide 5: After naming Pete, you hold him in your hand, and you have to decide what to do 
with him.  
 
Slide 6: You could do nothing about Pete. The plant will die if you do nothing because Pete 
will eat all the leaves (point to dead plant). Or, you could squish Pete so that he can’t eat 
any more leaves, and that will save the plant. (point to live plant) 
Now I need you to help answer some questions about the story and how you feel. There are 
no right or wrong answers, just tell me what you think.  
 
1. Remember, you get to decide what to do about Pete. One thing you might do is 
squish Pete. You can use this slider to show me how LIKELY you would be to squish 
Pete.  
 
If you keep the slider over here (0) it means you are really, really sure you would not 
squish Pete. If you move it to the 1, it means you would not squish Pete, but you’re only 
a little bit sure about that. If you move it to the 2, it means you don’t know if you would 
squish Pete or not. If you move it to the 3, it means you would squish Pete, but you’re 
only a little bit sure about that. If you move it all the way over here (5) it means you are 
really sure you would squish Pete. Can you slide the slider to show me how likely you 
would be to squish Pete?  
 
 
 
 
2. Do you think it is OK or NOT OK to squish Pete? Can you tell me why you think so? 
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3. Now, I want you to imagine how you would feel if you really did squish Pete.  
 
This face (far left) means squishing Pete would make you feel really, really bad. This face 
means you’d feel a little bit bad about squishing Pete. This face means you wouldn’t feel 
bad or good about squishing Pete. This face means you’d feel good about squishing Pete. 
And this face means you’d feel really, really good about squishing Pete. Can you point to 
how squishing Pete would make you feel? 
 
 
 
4. For this question, you get to pick your 5 favorite stickers out of this box (have 10 in 
the box to start). Those are really neat stickers you picked! You get to decide what to do 
with the stickers. Do you see these two containers? This one with the house on it is where 
you can put the stickers you want to take home with you. And this one with the caterpillar on 
it is where you can give stickers for Pete. Every sticker that gets put in this box helps to keep 
Pete from getting squished. You can put as many stickers as you want in your container to 
take home and as many as you want in Pete’s container! I’m going to turn around now so I 
can’t see where you put your stickers. Tell me when you’re all done!  
 
OK great! Now I have just a few more questions. Remember, there are no right or wrong 
answers, it’s just what you think. You can answer each question with a “yes” or a “no”. OK? 
 
5. Experience (create a summative score, 0-3; 1 point for each “yes”) 
a. Can Pete feel pain like you do? 
b. Can Pete can feel hungry like you do? 
c. Can Pete have feelings, like being happy or scared, like you do?  
 
6. Agency (create a summative score, 0-3) 
a. Can Pete think like you do? 
b. Can Pete can do things on purpose like you do?  
c. Can Pete remember things like you do?   
 
7. Can you tell me how much you like caterpillars using these faces? This one (far left) 
means you really, really don’t like them and this one (2nd from left) means you don’t like them 
just a little. This one (middle) means you don’t like or dislike them. This one (2nd from right) 
means you like them a little bit, and this one (far right) means you really, really like them. 
Can you point to the face that shows how much you like caterpillars?  
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Ending the game  
You were really helpful today, thanks for answering so many questions for me! It was really 
neat to learn about what you thought about the story and the caterpillar. Did you have any 
questions about the game we played today? Well you know what, I have a thank-you gift for 
you to take home today for being such a great helper. Let’s go get it!     
 
NOT NAMED CONDITION (replace all “Pete” references with “the caterpillar”) 
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Appendix C 
Parent/Legal Guardian Consent for Child to Participate in Research 
Information to Consider About this Research 
 
Title of Research: Moral Rights – Hypothetical  
Principal Investigator: Dr. Robyn Kondrad (ASU) 
Department: Psychology 
Contact Information:  
Dr. Robyn Kondrad: agelabs@appstate.edu; 828-262-6978 
 
What is the purpose of this research? You are invited to participate in a research 
study to investigate how children learn about their environment. By conducting these 
studies, we hope to learn more about the kinds of verbal and non-verbal information 
children pay attention to, and how they use that information to guide their behavior. 
For example, if a non-human entity looks more like or shares more characteristics 
with humans, will they be more likely to attribute moral feelings like empathy and 
moral rights like not being harmed to that entity? The results of these studies will be 
presented at research conferences and published in scholarly journal articles.   
 
Why am I being invited to take part in this research? You are being invited to 
allow your child to participate because your child is the right age for the questions 
we are interested in studying. If you volunteer for your child to participate in the 
study, your child will be one of about 100 children to do so.   
 
What will I be asked to do? The research procedures will be conducted in a quiet 
space either at your child’s school or daycare facility at a time designated by the 
teacher or in our research space at Appalachian State University. The time required 
for your child’s participation is one 15- to 20-minute session. The session will be 
video-taped so the research team can have an accurate record of your child’s 
responses. If you agree to allow your child to participate, your child will be asked if 
s/he would like to play a game with the researcher. If your child verbally agrees, then 
we will play a game where your child gets to learn about some bugs and will decide 
what will happen to the bugs. At the end, we’ll ask your child some questions about 
how they were feeling and what they were thinking during these games. We may 
also ask parents to complete a short questionnaire about your child’s experience 
with insects and other pets.  
 
What are possible harms or discomforts that I might experience during the 
research? Some children may experience stress about whether the bugs in the 
story should be squished or harmed in any way. The researcher will explain that the 
children can choose to keep the bugs safe from harm if that’s what they prefer. The 
researcher will ensure that your child is comfortable during the study. Children will 
learn that no bugs were harmed at the end of the study, and will get to watch a cute 
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video about kittens. Children generally enjoy playing the types of games we use in 
our research.   
 
What are possible benefits of this research? There may be no personal benefit 
from your or your child’s participation but the information gained by doing this 
research may help others in the future. This research should help us learn more 
about how children attribute moral rights to non-human entities like bugs.     
 
Will I be paid for taking part in the research? We will not pay you for the time you 
volunteer your child to be in this study; however your child (if you or the 
preschool/daycare allows it) will receive a small item (e.g., stickers or a small toy) for 
participating. It will not cost you, your child, or (if applicable) your child’s 
preschool/daycare anything to participate.  
 
How will you keep my private information confidential? The information that 
your child provides in the study and his/her videotape will be kept confidential. Your 
and your child’s information will be combined with information from other children 
taking part in the study when we share it with other researchers. You and your child 
will not be identified in any published or presented materials. Identification codes but 
not names will be used on all documents. Your files will be stored in the 
investigator’s office under lock and key. Identifiable information will be destroyed 
once we are no longer working with it. Videotapes will be digitally archived and 
password-protected, and will be viewed only by trained research assistants unless 
you have given explicit permission for other uses on the video release form 
attached.  
 
Whom can I contact if I have a question? The people conducting this study will be 
available to answer any questions concerning this research, now or in the future.  
You may contact the Principal Investigator at 828-262-6978.  If you have questions 
about your rights as someone taking part in research, contact the Appalachian 
Institutional Review Board Administrator at 828-262-2692, through email at 
irb@appstate.edu or at Appalachian State University, Office of Research, IRB 
Administrator, Boone, NC 28608. 
 
Do I have to participate? You and your child’s participation in this study are 
voluntary. You and/or your child have the right to stop the study and/or withdraw 
from it at any time without penalty. If you or your child chooses to withdraw from the 
study, all video and data from your child’s session will be destroyed. If at any point 
you or your child want to stop participating or to withdraw from the study, simply tell 
the researcher and the session will be ended immediately.  
 
This research project has been approved on 06/23/2017 by the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) at Appalachian State University.  This approval will expire on 
06/22/2018 unless the IRB renews the approval of this research.  
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Parent/Legal Guardian Consent for Child and Self to Participate in Research 
Information to Consider About this Research 
 
Title of Research: Moral Rights - Hypothetical 
Principal Investigators: Dr. Robyn Kondrad (ASU; agelabs@appstate.edu; 828-262-
6978) Department: Psychology   
 
I have decided I want to take part in this research or I want my child to take 
part in this research.  What should I do now? If you have read this form, had the 
opportunity to ask questions about the research and received satisfactory answers, 
and want to participate with your child, then sign the consent form and video release 
form below and return it to the researcher or your child’s teacher (if applicable). You 
may keep a copy of the consent agreement for your records. 
 
Video Authorization: With your permission, video recordings taken during the study 
may be used in research presentations of the findings of the study, or for a variety of 
other reasons listed below.  Your child’s name would not be associated with any of 
these uses. If at any time in the future you change your mind about what you 
selected below, simply notify us by contacting Dr. Robyn Kondrad (828-262-6978; 
agelabs@appstate.edu) and we will stop using it (except in the case of already 
published books or journals).  
 
Please review the authorization below, indicate whether you do (Yes) or do not (No) 
agree to the video recordings being used in each of the ways indicated below, and 
then sign your name and date at the bottom.  
 
        Professional presentations of the findings (e.g., conferences)      Yes  No 
        In presentations to psychology classes at Appalachian State     Yes  No 
        In presentations at workshops or other recruiting events      Yes  No 
        On the AGE Labs website at Appalachian State       Yes  No 
        On the AGE Labs Facebook page          Yes  No 
        On scholarly websites (e.g., Dept. of Psychology at ASU)     Yes  No 
        In news reports of this research          Yes  No 
        On display in the AGE Labs or the Dept. of Psychology at ASU    Yes  No 
Consent for CHILD to participate  
___________________________________________________________________  
Child’s Name (Print) Birthdate (MM/DD/YY) Sex (M/F) Race/Ethnic  
             Identity 
 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Parent/Legal Guardian Name (Print)        Signature       Date  
 
Consent for PARENT to participate 
________________________________________________________________________________
Parent/Legal Guardian Name (Print)        Signature       Date  
